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THE FUR TRADE AND WESTERN CANADIAN
SOCIETY, 1670-1870
Introduction
The political, economic, and social history of present day Northwest Territories,
Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, was, for the first two hundred years of
European contact, a product of the fur trade. At various posts along the region's
principal rivers and lakes, traders would exchange such manufactured goods as
blankets, beads, guns, tobacco, and axes for native supplies of beaver, marten,
and muskrat pelts. In fact, beaver was so abundant that it came to be treated as a
currency throughout the Canadian North West. This trading system was highly
complex, involving not only the French, Scottish, and Canadian traders who
came from the St. Lawrence Valley, and the British traders who came from
Hudson Bay with their financial base in England, but the various native groups
as well. And the history of the fur trade is not only the story of the actual trade
itself, but also that of the new society created by the intermingling of fur traders
and natives in the Western interior.
Such noted scholars as Harold Adam Innis and Donald Creighton have
asserted that Canada exists in its present form because of the fur treade. Fur was
the single product or "staple" — like cod fish earlier in the Maritimes or wheat
on the prairies in a later period — that was so dominant as to set the tone for the
nation or region's economic and social development. The settlements, trans-
portation routes, and financial structures created in support of the fur trade, in
this view, moulded the east-west geographical unity of Canada. Innis remarked
of Canada that her "present boundaries were the result of the dominance of
furs...."
An examination of the fur trade must first focus, therefore, on the various
European thrusts into the interior from the St. Lawrence Valley and from
Hudson Bay, then turn to the rival economic, social, and transportation patterns
which emerged from these two traditions, and finally look at the results of their
conflict and eventual merger. Moreover, the fur trade was more than the story
of fur traders and their activities. Native people had a strong impact on the trade
and it equally had a significant influence on native life. Likewise, a new people,
the Metis, was created by the trade and had no small effect on the trade itself.
Finally, new elements, perhaps best symbolized by the Christian missionaries,
entered the Western interior in the nineteenth century to challenge the old
supremacy of the fur trade and lead to its eventual demise.
What emerges from the study of these various themes is a portrait of a unique
social and economic structure that helped to shape and continues to affect the
history of Western and Northern Canada.
Two Fur Trade Traditions J ~" '
The fur trade conflict between the St. Lawrence and Hudson Bay traders can be
divided into four distinct chronological periods: from 1670 to 1763, 1763 to
1904,1904 to 1821, and 1821 to 1870. The first period following 1670 saw both
the establishment of the British presence on the shores of Hudson Bay and the
initial forays by the French from the St. Lawrence Valley into the Western
interior. In 1668 Pierre Esprit Radisson and Medard Chouart, Sieur des
Groseilliers, two disenchanted French-Canadian fur traders, had convinced the
English court and several English businessmen that easy access to the best fur
land lay to the north through Hudson Bay. Within two years, the Hudson's Bay
Company had been formed. It proceeded thereafter to place its posts at the
mouths of the major rivers leading into the Bay, in order to entice the Indians of
the interior to come to the Bay to trade. The later appearance of rival traders
from New France and their Indian allies, intent upon the destruction of the
British trade, precipitated a generation of aggressive conflict. Between 1731 and
1749, Pierre Gaultier de Varennes, Sieur de La Verendrye, and his family
established various posts in what is now Northwestern Ontario and southern
Manitoba and briefly secured part of the Saskatchewan country fur trade for
New France. The defeat of France by Britain in 1759-60 abruptly interrupted
these pressures from the St. Lawrence, but only for the moment.
The first period of truly intense competition, which was often vicious enough
to generate violence among trading rivals, followed the establishment of British
control over New France in 1763 and the subsequent effort to "deregulate" the
Montreal-based St. Lawrence fur trade. A new breed of independent trader
emerged to replace the renowned coureurs de bois as fur traders. These
"pedlars," of first French and then British extraction, moved north and west into
the distant interior. Having established their initial base at either end of Lake
Superior — Michilimackinac to the east and Kaministikwia (later Ft. William,
now Thunder Bay) to the west — the pedlars took their trade goods deep into
the Western interior, where they spent the winter trading with the natives for
furs. Then, at an annual rendez-vous back at the Great Lakes, they would pay off
their Montreal-based suppliers with the furs they had accumulated, collect new
trading goods, and set off to repeat the process.
Often five or six pedlars competed for trade from what was essentially a single
location. The competition among both pedlars and the various Montreal
interests who supplied them was so ruinous as to force both into annual agree-
ments or partnerships. The men in the interior soon became known as "winter-
ing partners" or "winterers." The first major partnership of this kind occurred in
1779. This did not mean, however, that all were joined thereafter in peaceful
unification. Competition continued to fan the flames of animosity and violence
which remained part of the fur trade way of life. Alexander Mackenzie, the
famous explorer and trader, wrote of a particularly unpleasant situation, which
led in turn to another union of interests in 1787:
After the murder of one of our partners, the laming of another and
the narrow escape of one of our clerks, who received a bullet
through his powder horn, in the execution of his duty, they [the
Northwesters] were compelled to allow us a share in the trade. As
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we had already incurred a loss, this union was, in very respect, a
desirable event to us....
Ultimately, a more formal and comprehensive union between a variety of the
wintering and Montreal partners was forged in 1804 as the North West
Company.
During this period of internecine warfare among the St. Lawrence traders,
the Hudson's Bay Company had not exactly been "sleeping by the frozen sea" as
its detractors charged. From the late 1760s to 1774, the HBC sent no fewer than
forty-four expeditions lead by William Tomison, Samuel Hearne, William Pink,
and Louis Primo, among others. These expeditions possessed no mandate to
trade. Rather, they were designed to entice the Indians to journey to the posts at
the bayside. Unfortunately for the Company, however, this strategy had only
limited success, especially after the Montreal interests and their winterers began
to bring the trade to the Indians (rather than expect the Indians to travel to
them) and began to include significant quantities of alcohol in their trade goods.
In 1774 the Hudson's Bay Company finally countered by establishing an
inland trading post, Cumberland House. It was located at the junction of the
river systems that connected the Arctic and the Bay with the central plains.
With this single stroke, the war for the interior had become even more serious
and increasingly unforgiving. The economic struggle between the two giants of
the Canadian fur trade lasted nearly half a century, escalating in fury with the
formation of the North West Company in 1804 and subsiding only with the
amalgamation of the two wearying combatants under the HBC name in 1821.
The great crisis that finally precipitated the union by bringing the violent
rivalry to a head occurred in 1816 at the junction of the Red and Assiniboine
Rivers. It was an event from which neither company could ever completely
recover. Pressed by mounting debt and the prospect of poor fur returns, the
HBC had decided in the early 1800s to allow one of its principal shareholders,
Lord Selkirk, a Scottish nobleman interested in bringing dispossessed farmers to
North America, to establish one of his colonies at Red River, near present day
Winnipeg, on the edge of the buffalo country. Not only did the Nor'Westers feel
that the colony would be disruptive to the production of pemmican (dried
buffalo meat in fat) that was so critical to the provisioning of the northern
interior trade, settlement in general was anathema to the wintering traders of
both companies.
In the spring of 1816, to forestall possible action by the North West
Company, the Hudson's Bay Company actually seized the Nor'Westers' Ft.
Gibraltar, located near the colony, and attempted to intercept its pemmican
supply. In response, the Nor'Westers under Cuthbert Grant, a mixed blood of
Scottish-Cree descent, retaliated by seizing the Hudson's Bay Company posts
on the Assiniboine, and then by attacking the Hudson's Bay governor and killing
twenty of his men outside Ft. Douglas (the infamous Battle of Seven Oaks).
Later that winter Selkirk himself took possession of Ft. William, the greatest
North West Company post which was located at the head of Lake Superior.
The protracted and expensive litigation that followed, combined as will be seen
with a wide variety of economic and transportation problems, were major forces
that pushed the two companies to unite in 1821.
Union was achieved through a legal instrument known as the Deed Poll. By
the union, the NWC in effect ceased to exist and the HBC entered into elaborate
agreements with the component parts of its former rival. Essentially the Deed
Poll identified two major ranks: Chief Factors of which there would be twenty-
five, and Chief Traders of which there would be twenty-eight. Only Traders
could become Factors and, concomitantly, only clerks could become Traders.
Traders and Factors also received a share of the trade. A Factor was given 2/85
and a Trader 1785 of 40 per cent of the profits. The trade was to be regulated
through the annual meeting of Chief Factors known as the Northern Council,
much as the North West Company had regulated its trade through the annual
meetings at Ft. William. And in fact, despite its corporate disappearance, the
North West Company's personnel dominated the new appointments, becoming
fifteen of the twenty-five Chief Factors and seventeen of the twenty-eight Chief
Traders.
The overriding authority in the new regime was vested in the Governor, and
ultimately it was George Simpson, the new Governor of the Northern
Department and after 1826 Governor of all of Rupert's Land (as all the HBC
territories were called), who put his stamp on the next forty years. Simpson had
joined the HBC in 1820 at age thirty-four, when the fur trade rivalry was at its
zenith. Not a likeable man, he was nevertheless a thorough, tough, and uncom-
promising administrator. He made several exhausting and remarkable inspection
trips through Rupert's Land and at one point attempted to establish a residence
in the North West. Rigorous to a fault, Simpson exercised strict economy,
promoted allies who he had co-opted from the North West Company, vigor-
ously defended the Hudson's Bay Company's chartered monopoly, and fended
off political attacks in Canada and Great Britain as the agricultural potential of
the West became increasingly attractive to Company critics, missionaries, and
settlement advocates.
Economics of the Fur Trade
Beaver was central to the European felt hat that enjoyed enormous popularity
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Although by the mid 1800s the
introduction of the silk hat spelled a major decline for the trade in Western
Canada, by that time alternate uses, for example the fur coat, mitigated such
vagaries of changing fashion.
In structure, beaver fur consists of a surface guard hair, about two inches in
length, and an underhair of about one inch. The most valuable furs would be
taken in the winter when the underhair was the thickest, and the most valuable
of these would actually have been worn by the Indians, the fur side next to their
skin. The guard hair would then fall out, leaving a covering of soft downy
underhair, ideal for the felting process and well preserved by the natural oils of
the wearer.
So important was the beaver to the economy of the North West that most
trade items were calculated in terms of made (or prepared) beaver. One "made
beaver" at Ft. Simpson in the 1820s could procure a hatchet, two "made
beaver" a fine knife or cap, three a blanket or flannel shirt, six to ten a second-
hand gun, sixteen a blue capote (a frock overcoat with hood), and twenty to
twenty-five a new gun. Similarly, other pelts were also measured in "made
beavers." At Ft. Simpson for instance, one made beaver was worth 1.1 to
2 lynx, 1.2 to 7.5 marten, and 9.1 to 14.3 muskrat. Of course the standard of
trade by which these prices were derived could vary from year to year, from
company to company, and even from post to post, depending on local condi-
tions, markets, and the distance from York Factory or from Montreal.
Furs were traded for a wide range of goods. Powder, shot, guns, broad cloth,
and twine for fish nets remained the most sought-after commodities throughout
the history of the trade. Second in importance were brandy, hatchets, kettles,
and tobacco, while combs, hats, beads, and buttons were usually least in
demand, although these rankings could also vary from post to post. The Indians
always displayed a legitimate concern for the quality of the trade goods. Guns
rarely lasted more than one or two years, and were sometimes faulty enough to
explode on firing, causing permanent injury or death. There are also problems
with the quality of cloth and with the sizes of such manufactured items as
capotes. ...•;' ; • - - ,-,.
A great deal has been written on the trade process itself. Abraham Rotstein
has argued that the fur trade was more than an exchange of items; it was a
complex series of ceremonies whose principal objectives were not only econo-
mic, but social and political as well. He has asserted that the primary motive
behind Indian involvement in the trade was the creation and preservation of
intricate alliance systems. Other historians like Arthur Ray have argued that
trade was almost entirely an economic matter. Price and value, and individual
relationships with the Indian trading captains, or relationships sometimes based
on marriage alliances, were the critical factors in the evolution of the fur trade.
While the precise trade ceremony varied widely, an eighteenth-century
account survives of the events at York Factory. Several flotillas of canoes
assembled out of sight of the Factory, each captained by a leader. The various
leaders then exchanged gifts with the Chief Factor, and in ceremonies that lasted
two or three days, they made speeches and smoked the pipe. Only after these
ceremonies were completed did the actual trade begin. The exchange of goods
was conducted through a window in the "trade room" and only one Indian was
permitted in the room at a time, although their leader was allowed behind the
trade window to ensure fair measure.
Over the long term, it would appear that the fur trade was profitable. At least
it has been assumed that an economic activity that survived over two hundred
years must have been so. Careful examination has shown, however, that short-
term profits were often illusory and that stable long-term credit was more
important to survival in the trade. An analysis of the financing of the North
West Company trade in the early nineteenth century clearly illustrates the
problems created by the ineffective accounting and weak credit systems of the
winterer partnerships. All charges, including capital costs for such major items
as buildings and boats and operating costs such as wages and supplies, were
made against the year in which they occurred, simply because every year or
"outfit" was seen as a separate business venture. This contrasts with most com-
mercial enterprises, which average capital costs over the expected "life" of the
item in question in order to account for replacement or as an amortization of the
costs. The North West Company practice created an unrealistic picture of the
profits for years in which there were few capital expenditures. As a result, the
expectations of profits were generally too optimistic. At the same time, because
all charges were counted against the trade year to which they applied, it could
take as many as five or six years for the accounts on any one outfit or trading
season to be "wound up." For example, statistics on goods traded would have to
be gathered from the interior posts and the English markets and then specifically
attached to the proper year. Lag time in the trade made the system unworkable
and the attempt to unravel the North West Company books eventually drove
the accountants mad. From this perspective, the financial collapse of the North
West Company was virtually inevitable, although it happened almost
unknowingly.
The fur trade system that was managed out of Montreal involved little real
cash. The Montreal companies purchased trade goods from British suppliers
who were in turn paid in furs. Because it often took two to three years for those
furs to reach the European markets, the extension of credit by these suppliers
was essential; in effect, this was nothing more than an elaboration of the credit
system used in the Western interior by the Indian and the wintering trader. The
real liability of the Montreal fur company, then, was not the amount owed the
London supplier in cash, but rather a commitment to meet that debt in the
"currency" of furs.
The Hudson's Bay Company, the accounts of which were kept in a more
traditional fashion, would appear to have operated on a thin profit margin
throughout much of its history. A joint stock company, able to spread its liability
over a number of years, was more effective than the limited partnerships of the
North West Company, which in theory "wound up" its accounts with each out-
fit or trade year. The Hudson's Bay Company suffered its longest period of no
profit from 1690 to 1710, a situation which the shareholders seem to have toler-
ated without complaint. Firm management practices were brought to the
Company in 1712 by Sir Bibye Lake, Governor until 1743. During his tenure,
profits ranged from 10 to 30 per cent on an annual outlay of some £27,000.
These were hardly the colossal profits suggested by the Company's opponents,
but they were certainly substantial enough for the Company to continue in
operation. It was, all in all, a small, reasonably successful business.
As competition from Montreal increased in the latter half of the eighteenth
century and as the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars interrupted fur
markets, new and potentially serious financial problems marked the Company's
balance sheets. When Andrew Wedderburn, an established London business-
man, took over the Company with his relatives in 1809, it was burdened with a
£50,000 overdraft and little immediate prospect of being able to retire the debt.
Wedderburn reorganized and began to cut costs. The posts were compelled to
increase their reliance on local provisioning, an agricultural colony (as noted
earlier) was to be introduced at Red River, and redundant personnel were to be
eliminated. Although this helped retard the mounting debt, by 1820 the
Company had been forced to stretch its credit to £75,000. This was somewhat
offset by evidence that the inland posts were beginning to show profits.
Ultimately, the Hudson's Bay Company survived because its London Directors
knew exactly where every pound was invested and the return that could be
expected on each of these pounds. Unlike the NWC, the HBC was a stable
organization not liable to the expiration of any agreement among independent
partners, able to tap extended credit, and able to survive long periods without
the payment of dividends. It can thus be argued that it was the financial structure
of the Company rather than geography that determined success or failure in the
staple trade. If the North West Company entered the new concern of 1821 with
any strength at all, it was because it controlled about 78 per cent of the trade at
the peak of competition.
It is unlikely that the debate over whether the Hudson's Bay Company took
over the North West Company or vice versa will ever be resolved, but the rela-
tive merits of the various financial and accounting systems must become part of
the argument. It seems safe to conclude, however, that in the merger the HBC
London interests and the skilled HBC officers and NWC wintering partners in
the West gained from the union, whereas the Montreal capitalists and the
unskilled labourers lost. : ; . ; = ,
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Transportation Networks and Methods
Transportation was the single largest cost incurred in the fur trade, and one of
the distinguishing features between the HBC and NWC traditions. In the case of
the North West Company, "conveyance" made up fully one-half of its total
operating costs. The success of any fur trade concern was, therefore, often
directly proportional to the ingenuity it could harness in this one area. The
North West Company and its St. Lawrence predecessors had to create and
maintain an extensive supply and transportation network, which started in
Montreal and ended either in the Athabasca Country of the far North or in the
Columbia River basin flowing towards the Pacific Ocean.
The canot de maltre was used on the Montreal-to-Lake Superior route. It
carried up to one hundred packs of ninety pounds each, a crew of ten, and
several passengers, for a total of up to five tons. Usually thirty-five feet long, up
to six feet wide, and about thirty inches deep, it was made of birch bark on cedar
ribs sewn together with wattap (spruce tree roots). Because the canot de maltre
was labour-intensive to operate, and required constant replacement, the North
West Company also made increasing use of large sailing vessels on the Great
Lakes portion of the journey in the late eigtheenth and early nineteenth century.
The canot du nord was used for all travel from the western end of Lake
Superior on into the interior. Twenty-four feet long, four feet wide, and eight
inches deep, it was usually paddled by four to six men, and contained about
thirty-five of the large packs. The loaded canoe displaced about thirty-seven
hundred pounds. Because canoes rarely lasted more than one or two seasons,
approximately seventy were constructed each year.
It has been argued that the North West Company was at a distinct disadvan-
tage in the fur trade rivalry because of the long distances from Montreal. Indeed,
after the union of the two companies, the new enterprise only used the Montreal
route to convey passengers and mail, thus supporting the claim. In the
amalgamated company, goods and furs were shipped in the HBC tradition via
York Factory on Hudson Bay and, by the 1840s, through St. Paul, Minnesota,
rather than along the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence route. It could be argued, of
course, that this later route, using the new technologies of the steam ship and
locomotive, was merely the Montreal route revamped. It also opened the door,
as will be seen, to free traders to challenge the HBC monopoly in the West, just
as the NWC had done earlier.
Since the Hudson's Bay Company used the rivers that flowed into Hudson
Bay as their interior transportation network, geography dictated that they could
to
not rely on the canoe, for there were no birch trees at the Bayside. There was
also in that area no tradition of canoe building nor experienced paddlers among
the nearby native groups. A different solution was required. By the 1780s a shal-
low draught, dory-like vessel, later called the York Boat, had been introduced.
It was particularly effective under sail on large bodies of water, and it was not
susceptible to ice damage. It was, nevertheless, very heavy and extremely
cumbersome to portage. Poplar logs often had to be used as rollers to move the
boats over land. The boats tended to vary in size, but they usually had a
twenty-eight foot keel, and were capable of carrying up to one hundred and
twenty packs each weighing one hundred pounds. They were manned by a nine
member crew, and carried three or four passengers plus provisions. Built of
softwoods, these boats also lasted no more than two or three years. Although
the boats were used well into the last decades of the nineteenth century, their
eventual end was signaled in 1859-60 when the first river steamboat, the A nson
Northup, appeared on the Red River.
Technological innovation in transportation demonstrated the ingenuity of
the fur enterprises in adapting their far-flung operations to a harsh land. And
while the transportation network of the "Empire of the St. Lawrence" probably
overextended the resources of the NWC, it did emphasize the east-west unity of
the country. The general pattern set by the Montreal canoe routes and fur trade
posts was later repeated by railroads, highways, airlines, and telecommuni-
cations systems, and thus is central to understanding the nation's historical
development.
• \)
Social Dimensions and Labour Structures
The fur trade of the Canadian West, even in its very early years, required a work
force comprising hundreds of employees, as well as many indigenous families,
Indian and mixed blood, to make clothing, moccasins, and snowshoes, and to
construct and man boats, canoes, carts, and buildings. The fur traders themselves
married, had families, and over time created a new way of life unique to the
North West. While historians disagree over the precise nature of the society that
emerged, they do agree that both the Hudson's Bay Company and the North
West Company evolved their own social and labour structures. The important
contribution of natives and Metis to these structures will be examined
separately.
Historian Jennifer Brown describes the North West Company as a series of
Anglo-Scots partnerships based on close personal and family associations.
Within these partnerships, there was some opportunity for advancement, but a
clear line divided the senior partners or "bourgeois" from the French-Canadian
labourers or "voyageurs." In 1804 the North West Company employed
839 people: 45 bourgeois, 76 clerks, 45 interpreters, 16 guides, and 657 voya-
geurs. The partnership structure of course evolved over time, but it was also true
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that a number of the important bourgeois were related to Simon McTavish,
who in 1779 joined the first major coalition of business interests that would
eventually become the North West Company. His successors, the brothers
William and Duncan McGillivray, were also his nephews. Close family ties
between bourgeois in Montreal and the winterers who represented the
Company's interests in the interior ensured a unity of purpose. Alexander
Mackenzie, Simon Fraser, Angus Shaw, and other famous Nor'Westers were
also all related through marriage. The importance of the Scottish connection
becomes clear when it is considered that of the 128 senior fur trade figures from
1760 to 1800, 77 had a Scottish background.
What set the bourgeois and clerks apart from the voyageurs was not only their
Scots heritage and kinship ties, but their lifestyle, which even in the eighteenth
and nineteenth century managed to reach luxurious and even profligate levels.
When one of the bourgeois travelled in the interior, he did so in absolute com-
fort, often accompanied by servants, as well as his favorite foods and wine. In
1787 a number of the senior traders formed the Beaver Club, and restricted its
membership to those who had wintered in the interior. All such traders actually
in Montreal and able to attend were required to be present. The fare included
such esoteric items of the Western interior as roast beaver and pemmican, sup-
plemented by quantities of the finest wines and spirits. An excellent description
of such a session was given by the bourgeois, George Landmann:
In those days we dined at four o'clock, and after taking a satisfactory
quantity of wine, perhaps a bottle each, the married men... retired,
leaving about a dozen to drink to their health. We now began in ,;
right earnest and true highland style, and by four o'clock in the
morning, the whole of us had arrived at such a state of perfection,
that we could all give the war-whoop as well as Mackenzie and
McGillivray, we could all sing admirably, we could all drink like ''
fishes, and we all thought we could dance on the table without '•''
disturbing a single decanter, glass or plate.... We discovered that it :
was a complete delusion... and we broke all the plates glass bottles, '*'
and the table also....
Apparently, such revelry was also evident at the annual summer meetings
between the wintering and Montreal partners at Ft. William, where dinner was
held in the great hall which could accommodate over two hundred. On these
occasions, however, everyone in the company participated from guide to
partner, although the partners did dine from the formal head table set with the
best crystal and china while overlooking the trestle tables of the lower orders.
The voyageurs were for the most part French Canadians or, increasingly, of
French-Cree extraction. While en route to or from the interior there was a clear
social hierarchy in the canoes. Each was manned by a foreman, a steersman,
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and several middlemen. Within the canoe the foreman was in control. Every
four or six canoes had a "guide," or pilot, who had authority over the entire
brigade. Those voyageurs who paddled the Montreal-Ft. William route were
known as "pork eaters," those who paddled the interior waterways, hommesdu
nord. The considerable difference in status between a homme du nord and "pork
eater" was reflected in their pay. In the early 1800s, for example, steersmen on
the Montreal route received only slightly more than one-half the pay of their
Western counterparts. Each voyageur also received appropriate provisions, but
these were charged to their account. Since this was generally in deficit, a life of
perpetual servitude was almost ensured. As the combativeness of the Montreal
fur trade ended, the voyageurs' wages inevitably slumped.
The Hudson's Bay Company work and social structure was different in
several important ways. For instance, until 1810, the officers did not share in the
proceeds of the Company's profits. The "Chief Factor," who was responsible
for the operation of a major post and its trading hinterland, reported directly to a
"Governor," who was in turn responsible to the London Committee. At the
bayside posts, in the early eighteenth century, the Chief Factors, or the ship's
captains when in port, were invested with absolute authority. They were advised
by a council of officers, which generally included the senior craftsmen and the
sloopmaster. The skilled craftsmen at the post included shipwrights, carpenters,
coopers, masons, and blacksmiths, all of whom were generally engaged under
three- to five-year contracts. Internally, the posts were organized very much
along paternalistic familial or household lines, tempered by the understandable
military and naval considerations of an overseas trading operation.
By the early nineteenth century, about 80 per cent of the British labour force
in the HBC had been recruited in Scotland's northern Orkney Islands. Virtually
all were drawn from the middle and lower ranks of rural parishes. The
Orkneymen received a minimum annual wage of £6, plus room, board, and
clothing as labourers, and as much as £20 to £30 plus room, board, and clothing
for more complex occupations such as boat building. Very few worked in the
fur trade for a lifetime. Most served for eight years or less, and managed to save
the majority of their incomes for a farm back home. Opportunities for the
Orkneymen to move up in the fur trade hierarchy were not great to begin with,
and probably declined as the nineteenth century wore on. Ironically, the
Orkneymen acquired an undeserved reputation for being unreliable and some-
what less than diligent. As union with the North West Company became inevi-
table, the Company made an effort to decrease their numbers in the trade.
Jennifer Brown has argued that in the pre-union Hudson's Bay Company,
officer recruitment was less influenced by blood connections and ethnicity than
in the North West Company. At least in the early eighteenth century, it was
possible for men to rise to officer status through the ranks. By the end of the
century, however, the Company's need for white collar labour had forced it to
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recruit directly in Britain for clerks and writers. Such a corporate solution
reduced the chance of promotion through the ranks. Like all male organizations
in one measure or another, personal friendships between officers and subordi-
nates had a great deal to do with the rise of an individual through the system.
Within the Hudson's Bay Company, then, work connections rather than social
class or family connection were more important considerations in upward
mobility.
An equally important factor in the evolution of fur trade society was the
extensive network of servant families that derived from the distinctive North
West Company and Hudson's Bay Company traditions. By 1800, the North
West Company alone was responsible for the feeding of twelve to fifteen
hundred native women and children. At the Bayside, in defiance of Hudson's
Bay Company's stringent policy against cohabitation, the officers, and probably
a significant number of labourers, rather rapidly established marriage alliances
with the daughters of prominent Indian leaders. Indian wives were vital help-
mates whose presence not only cemented alliances, but who undertook the
chores of snowshoe-making, hide preparation, and sewing. On occasion they
also acted as guides and translators. There is some evidence to suggest that
before 1800 some HBC officers and men even had multiple wives, although the
fur traders from Montreal rarely had more than one. Marriages were solemnized
with much ceremony by the chief officer, according to the custom of the country
(a lafa^on dupays or du nord). The Indian practice of serial marriage, which in
the case of the Nor'Westers could mean "turning off wives upon retirement to
Canada, did exist, but became less and less prevalent as the European influence
expanded towards the latter part of the nineteenth century.
Fur traders made every effort to have their mixed blood children marry well.
The late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw a significant increase in the
number of mixed blood marriages between fur trading families. Sylvia Van Kirk
and others convincingly argue that these growing ties were the foundation for
the unique society that emerged in the West before 1870.
Such mixed blood marriages met their first serious challenges in the early
nineteenth century. The private life of George Simpson, Governor of Rupert's
Land, illustrates the changes that particulary affected mixed blood women.
Simpson's marriage to his British cousin, after two liaisons with native women a
lafaQon dupays, set the tone for a number of senior fur trade marriages. In 1821
he had "married" Betsey Sinclair, the mixed blood daughter of a former
Company officer. In 1822, after she had borne him a daughter, he asked a friend
to arrange for someone else to care for her. Later, in 1825, he took up with
Margaret Taylor, the sister of his personal servant, but after two more children
he "turned her off in 1830, in order to marry his white cousin.
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By the late 1820s, the status of these country wives had been further exacer-
bated by the arrival of new missionaries and their white wives. A general
questioning of the social acceptability of mixed marriages a lafaqon du pays
ensued. The social and racial struggle between white and mixed blood even-
tually reached a climax in Red River, the social hub of fur trade society, where a
concentration of mixed bloods had settled. In 1850, the tensions culminated in
an unpleasant and sensational lawsuit. Sarah Ballenden, the mixed blood wife
of Chief Factor John Ballenden, was rumoured to be having an affair with a
retired army officer, Captain Foss. White women in Red River, who saw
themselves as the keepers of the community's morals, banished Mrs. Ballenden
from their company. Because he had been implicated, Captain Foss sued for
defamation and won, but this "strife of blood" was to have long-term reper-
cussions. At the very least, it exaggerated the tensions between white and mixed
blood and added to the increasing instability of the fur trade society.
It would be a mistake to assume that most of the traders' offspring became
integrated into Company society. The majority at the Bayside, for example,
joined their mother's Indian family and eventually formed the basis of the
"homeguard." It was the homeguard natives who lived around the posts and
handled much of the provisioning. They also served as a source of casual labour
and became a critical component of the trading structure. Similarly, the children
of the Indian women and voyageurs on the southern plains formed the nucleus
of what would become the Metis peoples. While some attached themselves to
the posts like the homeguards, others formed semi-nomadic communities at
such places as Buffalo Lake which were strategically located for the buffalo hunt,
and where they came to control the production and distribution of pemmican.
The fur traders and their families lived their lives around the fixed posts,
which varied from the unique but unbearably cold stone fort at Churchill to the
more functional wooden structures at York Factory or Ft. William, to the single
log shelter of the pedlar. Usually these establishments were contained within
pallisaded walls, which frequently collapsed from rot. At the larger posts, espe-
cially in the nineteenth century, there would be a "big house" for the senior
traders and their families, the clerks' quarters, a men's house, and various
warehouses. Despite their military character these forts — or factories (places
where Factors traded) — were rarely used for defence. Indeed, many of the
industrial buildings were outside the walls.
While fort life was generally structured and disciplined, the men's houses
were incredibly untidy even by the standard of the day. The yards with their
numerous dogs and garbage were a cacophony. Furniture was crude and simple.
By contrast, the interior of the big houses were dressed with the best that British
civilization could offer. There were excellent libraries at Ft. Carry, Ft.
Chipewyan, and York Factory, and at the grander posts a pianoforte might grace
the parlour.
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Agriculture and horticulture were also practised on a limited scale, with
gardens, fields, livestock, and barns being the norm, especially in the nineteenth
century. Ft. Edmonton, for example, was well known for its fields and horse-
racing track. Agricultural success was limited however, and even Red River
never managed to sustain itself without the buffalo hunt.
Native People and the Fur Trade
Historians and anthropologists have debated the degree to which the Indians
directed or benefitted from the fur trade and the degree to which they became
captives within an inevitable process of cultural erosion. It has been argued by
some scholars that European technologies and the demand for furs caused
permanent alteration to labour structures and Indian cultural habits. Some
would further assert that the end result was a dangerous and unwarranted
dependency upon European commodities that destroyed native self-sufficiency
soon after first contact.
The acquisition, quantity, and consumption of trade goods played a signifi-
cant role in changing the nature of native societies. Metal implements, European
weaponry, and textiles soon became necessities rather than luxuries to those
tribes closest to white contact. Not infrequently, the natives involved in direct
trade with the companies or acting as intermediaries in distant trading networks
did not procure sufficient pelts to acquire the goods that they now perceived as
vital to their existence. In response, the companies or independent traders as
noted before initiated a credit system, often helping their native trading partners
to accumulate so stupendous a debt that it was impossible to retire. There were
two sides to this system. On the one hand, the traders' personal debt structure
could escalate beyond reasonable proportions itself posing either personal
bankruptcy or, for the company servants, severe reprimands or possibly dis-
engagement from the service. On the other hand, and here there was a delicate
balance to maintain, a trader who refused to extend credit risked the loss of his
native contacts to those who would. Ultimately, it seemed that from the traders
vantage point, a manageable level of native indebtedness was an appropriate
"social control" technique to create a bond of dependency between his native
suppliers and himself — a socio-economic structure that might have paved the
way for the inept handling of Indian affairs during the later settlement period.
Of course, these bonds were not uniform. They varied from one native group to
another, depending on each band's geographical position, alliance systems, and
reliance on European goods as daily necessities as opposed to rejectable luxuries.
The Indians of the Western interior, particularly the Cree, rapidly adapted to
the trade. In the mid seventeenth century, during the period of first contact, the
Cree inhabited the Canadian Shield, possibly as far West as The Pas, in today's
Manitoba. At the Bayside posts, they traded their own furs and increasingly
acted as intermediaries for the natives further off in the interior. Then, as the
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French explorers and traders moved deeper into the West, the Cree attempted
to preserve their position by also moving westward. In the late 1700s, they
numbered about three thousand in the Western interior, but were reduced to
about sixteen hundred by the tragic measles epidemic of 1819. In order to
maintain their position of dominance, the Cree were forced to ally themselves
with the Assiniboine, the most numerous of the southern plains people. Their
joint alliance against the Blackfoot Confederacy lasted until the middle of the
nineteenth century and dominated the early political economy of the fur trade,
even after the 1839 smallpox epidemic had altered the character of the alliance.
After the Assiniboine had been ravaged by that epidemic, their territory shrank
considerably. The Plains Cree, however, had by this time been vaccinated
against the disease and expanded into the vacated Assiniboine lands. By the
1860s they numbered approximately ten thousand and their influence extended
over much of the central plains.
The south-western plains of the interior were the territory of the Blackfoot
Confederacy, which included a population of some nine thousand at the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century. The Confederacy included the Piegan, the Blood,
and the Blackfeet (who gave their name to the Confederacy), their allies the
Sarcee, and until 1861 the Gros Venires. They traded with the Cree at the
junction of the North and South Saskatchewan Rivers near present day Prince
Albert, but since they were buffalo hunters their reliance on the fur trade was
always marginal. Nevertheless, the trade was not without its impact, since they
also traded pack horses, pemmican, wolf and fox pelts, and buffalo hides to the
HBC, along with pelts obtained from raids on American traders to the south.
The trade probably tended to increase the power of the Blackfoot Chiefs, since
the Company recognized them as leaders in the trade ceremonies. And the trade
perhaps influenced the incidence of polygamy, since wives were of critical
importance in the processing of buffalo hides.
The Athapaskan people inhabited the area north of the Cree and west along
the Churchill. Their numbers included the Hare, Dogribs, Slaveys, Beaver, and
Chipewyan. They were a people who favoured the forest and the river rather
than the tundra or plains. The impact of the fur trade on the Athapaskans is
worth noting. Direct contact began with the American pedlar, Peter Pond,
when he established the first trading post in the area in 1778. During the first
half of the nineteenth century, the Athapaskans' basic cultural patterns seemed
to have been retained. No single dimension of the trade had become important
enough to alter existing cultural patterns, and the people generally remained
uncommitted to the European trade system. Few of them actually made trips to
the fort, and in the early 1800s one group failed to appear for two years in a row,
even though it lived only two days away. Yet some changes did occur among
the Athapaskans. The gun accentuated the feast-and-famine cycle, causing them
to disperse further throughout their hunting areas. This probably tended to
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exaggerate tensions between various families and groups as might the increasing
tendency toward specialization. Entire families were employed at gathering fish
or hunting caribou for the fur posts, and thus began to gather frequently at the
meat and fish camps nearby. The attraction of medical assistance during the
epidemics of the nineteenth century would likely have had the same centripedal
effect. In the end, however, the Athapaskans remained devoted to hunting and
trapping, while the trade remained a secondary pursuit.
The Assiniboine, like the Blackfoot, did not become entirely dependent upon
the trade for their existence. They tended to trade for luxuries like alcohol and
tobacco, or for a few unavoidable essentials such as ammunition. The Cree,
however, were reputed to be almost totally dependent. As early as 1801 Daniel
Harmon, a well known fur trader, noted of the Cree:
The Indians in this quarter have been so long accustomed to use
European goods, that it would be with difficulty that they could
now obtain a livelihood without them. Especially do they need fire
arms, with which to kill their game, and axes, kettles, knives, etc.
They have almost lost the use of bows and arrows; and they would
find it nearly impossible to cut their wood with implements made
of stone or bone.
A cycle of dependence was thus begun that, with the decline of the fur trade in
the later 1800s, would find its focus shifting from the Company to the missions
and ultimately to the Canadian government. Unfortunately, it was a cycle that
these agencies were unable or unwilling to break and thus one that continues to
the present day.
The Metis
The mixed blood communities of the Western interior, so important as already
seen to so many aspects of the fur trade, have too often been regarded as one
group with a single identity. The situation is far more complex. In the eighteenth
century, the Indian women around the Bayside factories often mated with the
Company's servants and bore their children. Their mixed blood progeny, except
for those who identified with their European fathers, were usually absorbed into
their mother's families to form the homeguard Cree. It is difficult to determine
whether English-speaking "half breeds," perhaps best identified as the Hudson
Bay English, who did not become absorbed as homeguard Cree actually devel-
oped an identity of their own. After the founding of Selkirk's Red River Colony
in 1812, and later with the union of the two companies and the appearance of
discharged and retired servants in the settlement, the opportunity arose for such
people to form a unique English-speaking mixed blood community. Because of
their association with the Company, the Hudson Bay English did not, for
example, side with the Metis in the opposition to the founding of Selkirk's
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settlement. They were a people "in between," not certain of whether they were
Indian, British, or Metis. Yet, as a result of the crises within the settlement in the
1860s and their own largely Protestant heritage, those Hudson Bay English in
Red River increasingly identified with their European ancestry. Many others,
however, who had moved to the interior or already lived there, such as Charles
Pratt, the Church Missionary Society catechist, and his entire family, joined
various Indian bands and eventually moved onto reserves with them.
The Metis, by contrast, were mixed blood resulting from unions of Cree
women with the North West Company's French-Canadian voyageurs or with
the NWC's Scottish bourgeois, although unions with Ojibway and Chipewyan
women also occurred. As a result, the Metis were Roman Catholic and Cree- or
French-speaking. As early as 1812-14, the Metis numbered several thousand.
They lived a semi-nomadic existence, ranging across the plains with settlement
at such places as Buffalo Lake, Ft. Carlton, Ft. Edmonton, Rocky Mountain
House, and of course Red River.
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The most famous of the early Metis was Cuthbert Grant of White Horse
Plain. Grant's father, a Nor'Wester, had been at Ft. Chipewyan in 1789, and
was later placed in charge of the North West Company's posts on the Upper
Assiniboine. Here Grant was born of an Indian mother. When his father died,
Cuthbert was sent away for his education, first to Montreal and then to Scotland.
He returned to the Northwest in 1812, just as Selkirk was establishing the new
settlement at Red River. It was Grant's leadership of the fight against the colony
that precipitated a coalition of sentiment among the Metis that has often been
seen, along with the Riel Resistance of 1869 and the Northwest Rebellion of
1885, as fostering and securing a Metis sense of nationhood. When it became
clear that, despite the destruction of Governor Semple's party at Seven Oaks,
their opposition had failed, Grant persuaded the Metis to settle on river lots
along the Assiniboine near the White Horse Plain and along the banks of the
Red, south of the Assiniboine. (The English-speaking settlements were a few
miles to the north.)
Settled or not, the Metis economy centred on the buffalo hunt. To ensure a
steady supply of pemmican as the staple provision of the fur trade, the companies
had strategically established trading houses in the main bison regions. In the first
decades of the nineteenth century, for example, the North West Company alone
required approximately forty to sixty thousand pounds of pemmican each year.
The demands of the amalgamated Company after 1821 increased dramatically,
reaching approximately one hundred thousand pounds in 1840 and about
double that in 1870. The Metis also supplied much of the buffalo meat required
by the Red River settlement, which at even a conservative estimate would have
been about two million pounds per year in 1830 and about eight million pounds
>n 1870.
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Writing in the mid 1850s, Alexander Ross, the Red River historian, provides
perhaps the best description of the Red River hunt, which was the largest on the
plains:
Imagine four hundred horsemen entering at full speed a herd of
some thousands of buffalo, all in rapid motion. Riders in clouds of
dust and volumes of smoke, which darken the air, crossing and
re-crossing each other in every direction [,] shots on the right, on the
left, behind, before, here, there, two, three [,] a dozen at a time,
everywhere in close succession, at the same moment. Horses
stumbling, riders falling, dead and wounded animals tumbling here
and there, one over the other; and this zig zag and bewildering melee
continued for hours or more together in wild confusion. ,
 t
Despite this apparent chaos, the hunts themselves were conducted in a struc-
tured and orderly fashion by the captain of the hunt. So critical were the hunts
that one-third of the Red River Metis participated. In one afternoon in 1849,
1,776 cows were killed, yielding 1,213 bales of dried meat, 166 sacks of fat
(200 Ibs. each), and 556 bladders of marrow (12 Ibs. each). The number of carts
involved in the hunt increased from 540 in 1820 to 1,210 in 1840.
The lifestyle and sociability of the Metis, especially during the heyday of the
fur trade from 1821 to 1860, generated much folklore. Unlike their European
progenitors, they were not work oriented — they did not live to work. The things
that were of utmost importance were their kin, their social life, and those things
that allowed one to excel in the hunt — guns and horses. Most "squatted" on
their long, narrow river lots, rather than bothering to take out a formal land title,
and they put little time in agriculture, except perhaps to plant a few acres of
barley and a patch of potatoes. The Metis bjiilt wooden homes using the Quebec
post-on-sill method. A review of their income and expenditures would suggest
that they took considerable pride in their clothing. Metis men could be generally
found in a blue cloth capote with brass buttons, a red and black flannel shirt
which also served as a waist-coat, buff-leather moccasins, an "assumption sash"
around the waist, and trousers of brown and white homespun. Women dressed
more conservatively in a dark shirt or dress, moccasins, and a shawl to cover the
head.
The Metis saw themselves as more than mere buffalo hunters and provi-
sioners. By the 1840s they were agitating with considerable militancy for the
right to conduct their own fur trade, despite the HBC monopoly rights, and to
act as independent freighters. They were strongly encouraged in this by the
Catholic clergy. In 1849 the Hudson's Bay Company in its last major effort to
enforce the exclusivity of its 1670 charter arrested a Metis, Guillaume Sayer,
and charged him with trafficking in furs. The Red River court found him guilty
but, under considerable duress from a band of armed Metis, recommended
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mercy. The Chief Factor followed by dropping all other charges. From that
time on, the fur trade was in effect free, and a large number of Red River Metis
began to trade and freight on their own account, taking advantage of the new
transportation facilities through St. Paul to the south. It should be remembered,
however, that the Company remained the overwhelming economic presence in
the region and continued to act as the principal employer.
After 1850 a small Metis merchant class developed in Red River and provided
leadership for the community. Louis Riel's father was an early member of that
elite and his various business enterprises were symbolic of the vitality of the
Metis interests. It was this small and tightly knit elite who, along with the
Catholic clergy, influenced the local exercise of authority, and continued to
encourage the successful opposition to the Company's monopoly, which led in
turn to the final collapse of the fur trade system that had dominated the interior
for nearly two centuries.
The Missionary Challenge
In addition to these internal social and economic pressures in the West, external
factors were injected into the region that also undermined the old order of the
fur trade. Political and economic concerns in Britain, expansionists in
land-hungry Upper Canada, and later politicians in Ottawa all saw the West as
a golden field of opportunity, in which the fur trade would be pushed aside to
accommodate their own ambitions. Foreshadowing this challenge and first on
the scene were the Christian missionaries, whose external ideas soon influenced
the internal dynamics of Western society.
With the arrival of the Roman Catholic Church in 1818, the Church of
England in 1820, and the Methodists in 1840, the missionary became an
important social force in the interior and a catalyst in the decline of the fur trade.
In opposing the trade, the missionaries actively worked toward its abolition and
for its replacement by agriculture. The fur trader for his part consistently
opposed the missionary. In the end Simpson only allowed them into Rupert's
Land because of their influence in the British parliament, where a growing
concern for indigenous peoples everywhere in the Empire forced an attitude of
diplomatic concession on the Company. Initially, Simpson hoped to contain the
Catholic, Anglican, and other Protestant missionaries within the settlement at
Red River. Then in 1840, the Methodists, who appeared least antagonistic
toward the Company's trade, were permitted to establish a station at Rossville
near Norway House. It was there that the Rev. James Evans perfected a Cree
syllabic alphabet, which is still in use today. Much to the Company's annoyance,
he also fomented a degree of labour unrest about the brutal conditions on the
Red River-York Factory boat brigades. At Simpson's connivance Evans was
recalled in 1846.
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Yet the dam had been breached. The pressure to establish agricultural mission
settlements in the interior of Rupert's Land could not now be resisted. Soon the
Catholics and Anglicans had stations throughout the Western Interior. In the
1840s and 1850s, successful settlements ranging from a handful to a hundred
Indian or mixed blood families were established at such sites as St. Peter's (Red
River), Rossville (Norway House), Stanley (Churchill River), Pigeon Lake
(central Alberta), Prince Albert (central Saskatchewan), Ft. Victoria (east
central Alberta), and The Pas (northern Manitoba).
Not all missionaries encouraged settlement with equal vigour. While the
Methodists and most Anglicans believed that settlement must be started and
agriculture learned before Christianity could be taught with any success,
Presbyterians and Catholics believed that if there was resistance to the plough,
Christianity could be taught in any case. Nevertheless, missionaries invariably
encouraged agriculture, but with minimal success, given the soil conditions, the
unsuitable planting varieties, early frosts, and a decided lack of markets. Where
settlements flourished as at Rossville, they did so only because of the employ-
ment opportunities offered by the fur trade. Even Simpson realized that the
concentration of native labour at the various posts, which the missionary
influence had helped stabilize, could be of benefit to the Company.
The agricultural settlements probably accentuated the cycle of native
dependence brought on by the fur trade. It was a common belief among mis-
sionaries that agriculture failed largely because of Indian inferiority rather than
because of climatic or soil conditions. Despite mounting frustrations, exacer-
bated by their own ignorance of Western agricultural requirements, the
missionaries continually provided new supplies for yet another try. When the
fur trade collapsed in the late 1860s and early 1870s, the missionaries continued
to provide their habitual assistance.
By encouraging agricultural settlement that was essentially antithetical to the
wide-open nomadic life of the fur trade and the buffalo hunt and by spreading
social and moral values that fragmented the community, the missionaries
increased the collective tension in Red River and thus hastened the end of the
old order.
Conclusion
The pressures which brought on the collapse of the Western fur trade were
irresistible. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the beaver hat was replaced
with silk. Although the trade remained viable as new uses were found for fur, it
made the trade marginally less profitable in an era when the Hudson's Bay
Company and independent free traders were again in serious competition.
More importantly, from the 1850's onward it was inevitable that settlement
would emerge to press the trade deeper and deeper into the Canadian Shield
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and further and further from the centres of population and commerce that were
being developed in the south. The threat of manifest destiny from a United States
looking to expand northward on the prairies prompted a greater interest in the
Western interior by both imperial politicians in Britain and western expan-
sionists in her Canadian colonies. It was therefore becoming increasingly
obvious that the fur trade and its financial and social structures were marking
time — and that they lacked the strength and internal cohesion to resist these
other interests soon to dominate the West.
The purchase of the Hudson's Bay Company in 1862 by the International
Financial Association with its own interests in settlement, and railroad and
telegraph development, as much as the sale of Rupert's Land to the Dominion
of Canada in 1869-70, marked the end of an economic and social system that
had been underpinned by the fur trade. The inhabitants of Rupert's Land were
not consulted over their destiny and objected strenuously enough to draw
Imperial troops to Red River to oust the new provisional Metis government
under Louis Riel. But the end had been inevitable for some time.
Yet, although the course of fur trade history was often determined from the
metropolis, whether London or Montreal, a unique society had been formed in
Rupert's Land and that society, with all of its diverse subcomponents, possessed
sufficient vitality of character to affect politics, society, and ideas in Western
Canada even now.
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SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
In the last fifteen years, the fur trade has become the subject of new scholarly
insights. The pre-1970 volumes which continue to survive as landmark works
are A.S. Morton, The History of the Canadian West to 1870 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1939); E.E. Rich, The Hudson's Bay Company,
three volumes. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1960); and of course H.A.
Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada (Yale University Press, 1930, and reprinted in
several editions since). The best brief if uneven synthesis remains E.E. Rich, The
Fur Trade and the Northwest to 185 7 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967).
Of these early scholars, Innis has had the greatest impact on Canadian his-
toriography, although not on fur trade studies. Fur trade historians have not
used Innis' staple thesis as a theoretical framework and have instead proceeded
in their respective isolated directions. This has been pointed out by Adrian
Tanner in "The End of Fur Trade History," Queen's Quarterly (Spring 1983),
pp. 176-91. Neither A.S. Morton nor E.E. Rich constructed their work on the
foundation of the staple thesis. Indeed, L.G. Thomas, who has influenced many
of today's fur trade historians, has pointed out in his introduction to the reprint
of A.S. Morion's volume that Morton had no overriding historiographical
approach, although he did attempt reinterpretations of such individuals as
Selkirk and LaVerendrye. Rich for his part saw the development of the West in
imperial terms and was most concerned about the politics of trade in the context
of international relations.
Recently there have been two excellent surveys of the fur trade period: Daniel
Francis, Battle for the West: Fur Traders and the Birth of Western Canada
(Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1982); and Glyndwr Williams, "The Hudson's
Bay Company and the Fur Trade: 1670-1870," The Beaver (Autumn 1983).
Both are highly recommended in that they attempt to encompass all of the recent
research in a readable form.
In recent years there has been a particular concentration on the role of the
Indian in the fur trade. The best such work has been by Arthur Ray. Of parti-
cular importance, although they are very difficult reading, are his Indians in the
Fur Trade 1660-1870 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974); and with
Donald B. Freeman, Give us Good Measure: An Economic Analysis of Relations
Between the Indians and the Hudson's Bay Company Before 1763 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1978). Daniel Francis and Toby Morantz, Partners
in Furs: A History of the Fur Trade in Eastern James Bay 1600-1870 (Kingston
and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983); and Shephard Krech
III, The Subarctic Fur Trade: Native Social Economic Adaptations (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 1984) are useful accounts. The intro-
ductory chapters in Gerald Friesen, The Canadian Prairies: A History
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(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) are also excellent summaries of
the impact of the trade on the native populations of the plains.
Major attention has recently been devoted to the social history of the trade.
The principal volumes are Sylvia Van Kirk's Many Tender Ties: Women in Fur
Trade Society in Western Canada 1670-1870 (Winnipeg: Watson & Dwyer,
1980); and Jennifer S.H. Brown, Strangers in Blood: Fur Trade Company
Families in the Indian Country (Vancouver: University of British Columbia
Press, 1980). A good indication of various other work being done on labour and
social history issues is contained in essays edited by Arthur Ray and Carol Judd,
Old Trails and New Directions: Papers of the Third North American Fur Trade
Conference (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980). Van Kirk argues that
there was a unique Western society that recognized Indian-white relations and
where native women had an important and determined role. It was the intrusion
of white women beginning in the 1830s that led to the deterioration of that
society. Jennifer Brown traces the differences between the fur trade social struc-
tures of the North West and Hudson's Bay Companies and redirects many earlier
assumptions about the importance of family connections in the trade.
The classic work on the Metis remains M. Giraud, Le Metis canadien (Paris:
Universite de Paris, 1945). The best recent set of articles which summarizes
work to date is Jennifer Brown and Jacqueline Petersen, eds., The New Peoples
(Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1985). Of particular interest are the
articles which attempt to place the English-speaking "half breeds" in context.
Biographical works relative to the fur trade are numerous but few are out-
standing. The best biography of Selkirk continues to be John Morgan Gray,
Lord Selkirk of Red River (Toronto: Macmillan, 1964); and of George
Simpson, John S. Galbraith's somewhat disappointing The Little Emperor,
Go vernor Simpson of the Hudson's Bay Company (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976).
The best biography of a fur trade Metis leader remains Margaret Macleod and
W.L. Morton, Cuthbert Grant ofGrantown (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1963). Most of the material on the Nor'Westers is unfortunate, although
Marjorie Wilkins Campbell North to the Sea: A Biography of William
McGillivray (Toronto: Clarke Irwin, 1975) is worth looking at.
Fur trade historians have set the Canadian standard for series of edited
documents and journals. The best volumes are by the Hudson's Bay Record and
Champlain Societies, though several others are worth consulting for their intro-
ductions. Of particular importance are W. Kaye Lamb, ed., The Journals and
Letters of Sir Alexander Mackenzie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1970); his The Letters and Journals of Simon Fraser, 1806-1808 (Toronto:
Macmillan, 1960); and Victor Hopwood, ed., David Thompson: Travels in
Western North America, 1784-1812 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1971). Frederick
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Merk, ed., Fur Trade and Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968
edition) is a classic account of Simpson's western travels.
The impact of the missionaries and the declension of fur trade society is
outlined by Frits Pannekoek in "The Rev. Griffiths Owen Corbett and the Red
River Civil War of 1869-70," Canadian Historical Review (June 1976); and
"The Anglican Church and the Disintegration of Red River Society,
1818-1870," in Carl Berger and Ramsay Cook, eds., The West and the Nation:
Essays in Honour of W.L. Morton (Toronto, 1976). See also his "The
Historiography of the Red River Settlement," Prairie Forum (Spring 1981).
Several kits are available as well from the National Museum of Man which
relate to the early West. The one by Sylvia Van Kirk is a particularly useful
summary. Teachers will find the Jackdaw kits on the fur trade, the North-West
Passage, Selkirk, and Riel helpful explorations, but these like other school
materials should be supplemented by academic readings.
26
HISTORICAL BOOKLETS SERIES
The Canadian Historical Association publishes a series of booklets to provide the general
reader, the teacher, and the historical specialist with concise accounts of specific historical problems.
They are written in English or French according to the author's preference, but will be translated
and available in both languages. The booklets are on sale to the public. Apply to the Treasurer,
Canadian Historical Association, 395 Wellington Street, Ottawa, Kl A ON3. Each member of the
Association receives one copy of each new booklet free at the time of publication. Prices of the
booklets are $ 1.50 each ($0.25 discount to book stores).
The following booklets have been published so far:
1. C.P. Stacey, The Undefended Border: The Myth and the Reality
1. G.F.G. Stanley, Louis Kiel: Patriot or Rebel?
3. Guy Fregault, Canadian Society in the French Regime
4. W.S. MacNutt, The Making of the Maritime Provinces, 1713-1784
5. A.L. Burt, Guy Carleton, Lord Dorchester, 1724-1808: Revised Version
6. Marcel Trudel, The Seigneurial Regime
1. F.H. Soward, The Department of External Affairs and Canadian Autonomy, 1899-1939
8. F.H. Underbill, Canadian Political Parties
9. W.L. Morton, The West and Confederation, 1857-1871
10. G.O. Rothney, Newfoundland: A History
11. Fernand Ouellet, Louis-Joseph Papineau: A Divided Soul '' ;'
12. D.C. Masters, Reciprocity: 1846-1911 (revised edition: 1983) :
13. Michel Brunei, French Canada and the Early Decades of British Rule, 1760-1791 '• '•'
14. TJ. Oleson, The Norsemen in America
15. P.B. Waite, The Charlottetown Conference, 1864 '
16. Roger Graham, A rthur Meighen
17. J. Murray Beck, Joseph Howe: Anti-Confederate *
18. W.J. Eccles, The Government of New France
19. Paul G. Cornell, The Great Coalition ,.
20. W.M. Whitelaw, The Quebec Conference
21. Jean-Charles Bonenfant, The French Canadians and the Birth of Confederation
22. Helen I. Cowan, British Immigration Before Confederation ,
23. Alan Wilson, The Clergy Reserves of Upper Canada
24. Richard Wilbur, The Bennett Administration, 1930-1935
25. Richard A. Preston, Canadian Defence Policy and the Development of the Canadian
Nation, 1867-1917
26. Lewis H. Thomas, The North- West Territories, 1870-1905
27. Eugene A. Forsey, The Canadian Labour Movement: The First Ninety Years (1812-1902)
28. Irving Abella, The Canadian Labour Movement: 1902-1960
29. Joseph Levitt, HenriBourassa—Catholic Critic ... , ..',.', ,[. ,,,,
30. Bruce G. Trigger, The Indians and the Heroic Age of New France , , -t,
31. R.C. Macleod, The North West Mounted Police, 1873-1919 '. ''* , . ' '
32. J.M.S. Careless, The Rise of Cities in Canada Before 1914
33. lan MacPherson, The Co-operative Movement on the Prairies, 1900-1955
34. Alan F.J. Artibise, Prairie Urban Development, 1870-1930 . .,
 f. ".
35. Richard Jones, Duplessis and the Union Nationale Administration
36. Ernest R. Foibes, Aspects of Maritime Regionalism, 1867-1927 , • .
37. Ruth Roach Pierson, Canadian Women and the Second World War . . ..•
38. Morris Zaslow, The Northwest Territories, 1905-1980
39. Michiel Horn, The Great Depression of the 1930s in Canada . < : ! , - • ; , ,
40. Cornelius J. Jaenen, The Role of the Church in New France , > ., ,; » . ..
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41. James W. St. G. Walker, Racial Discrimination in Canada: The Black Experience
42. Eric W. Sager and Lewis R. Fischer, Shipping and Shipbuilding in Atlantic Canada,
1820-1914
43. Frits Pannekoek, The Fur Trade and Western Canadian Society, 1670-1870
44. Robert Page, The Boer War and Canadian Imperialism
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